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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 








       Appellant 
v. 
 
ST. LUKE’S UNIVERSITY HEALTH NETWORK; ST. LUKE’S PHYSICIAN GROUP 
INC. FKA St. Luke’s Health Services Inc.; NAZARETH FAMILY PRACTICE 
 
     ________________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 5-15-cv-04017) 
District Judge: Honorable Joseph F. Leeson, Jr. 
________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
April 15, 2019 
 
Before: AMBRO, GREENAWAY, JR., and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 






AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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Dr. Ziba Monfared worked as a physician in Nazareth, Pennsylvania, for St. 
Luke’s University Health Network, St. Luke’s Physician Group, Inc., and Nazareth 
Family Practice (collectively “St. Luke’s”) from May 2010 until her termination in 
December 2014.  Dr. Monfared brought retaliation claims against St. Luke’s under Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq., 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and 
the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 PS. §§ 951 et seq.  She alleged that it 
terminated her after she complained about racially discriminatory and harassing remarks 
by management.    St. Luke’s filed a Motion to Compel Arbitration arguing that the 
dispute was covered by her employment agreement.1  The District Court granted the 
                                              
1 The applicable provision of the employment agreement reads in full: 
 
Governing Law; Dispute Resolution 
  
This letter agreement shall be deemed to have been made and shall be construed and 
interpreted in accordance with the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.  In 
any equitable action for specific performance or injunctive relief, the parties hereby 
submit to the jurisdiction of the Court of Lehigh County, Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania.  Except for actions for specific performance or injunctive relief, if a 
dispute or claim should arise that does not get resolved through negotiation of the 
parties, the parties will attempt in good faith to resolve the dispute or claim by 
mediation administered by the American Arbitration Association (AAA) under its 
Employment Mediation Rules, before resorting to arbitration. . . . If the matter has 
not been resolved within sixty (60) days of the initiation of such procedure, or if 
either party refuses to participate in the mediation, the controversy shall be resolved 
by binding arbitration under the Employment Arbitration Rules of the AAA, by one 
neutral arbitrator. . . . THE ARBITRATOR SHALL NOT AWARD ANY PARTY 
PUNITIVE OR EXEMPLARY DAMAGES, AND EACH PARTY HEREBY 
IRREVICABLY WAIVES ANY RIGHT TO SEEK SUCH DAMAGES.  All costs 
of mediation or arbitration shall evenly be divided between the parties, exclusive of 
each party’s legal fees, each of which shall be borne by the party that incurs them. 
 
J.A. at 4 (emphasis added; bold in text). 
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motion, after which the matter proceeded to arbitration.2  The arbitrator ultimately ruled 
in favor of St. Luke’s, and the District Court confirmed this award and dismissed Dr. 
Monfared’s claims. She now appeals, arguing that her claims were not subject to 
arbitration under the contract. 
We apply plenary review over the District Court’s ruling on the motion to compel 
arbitration, and we assess the motion to compel itself under the standard for summary 
judgment in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a).  Flintkote Co. v. Aviva PLC, 769 F.3d 
215, 219 (3d Cir. 2014).  Thus we view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party, and grant the motion only if there is no genuine dispute as to any material 
fact and the movant—here St. Luke’s—is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Id. 
The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq., “creates a body of 
federal substantive law establishing and governing the duty to honor agreements to 
arbitrate disputes.”  Century Indem. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 584 
F.3d 513, 522 (3d Cir. 2009); see also Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. 
Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).  To decide whether to compel arbitration under the FAA, 
we first consider “whether there is a valid agreement to arbitrate between the parties.”  
Flintkote Co., 769 F.3d at 220.  If so, we then consider “whether the merits-based dispute 
in question falls within the scope of that valid agreement.”  Id.    Here, the parties agree 
that Dr. Monfared’s employment contract contained a valid arbitration agreement.  See 
                                              
2 The record does not reflect whether, in accord with the terms of the employment 
contract, the parties engaged in mediation before proceeding to arbitration.  As the parties 
have not discussed the question of mediation, we presume it does not affect our analysis. 
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Appellant’s Br. at 15–16.  The only question, therefore, is whether her claims are within 
the scope of that agreement. 
“In determining whether the particular dispute falls within a valid arbitration 
agreement’s scope, ‘there is a presumption of arbitrability[.]’”  Century Indem. Co., 584 
F.3d at 524 (quoting AT & T Techs., Inc. v. Comm. Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 650 
(1986)).  This presumption applies whenever a contract has an arbitration clause and is 
“particularly applicable where the clause is [] broad.”  AT & T Techs., Inc., 475 U.S. at 
650.  When the presumption applies, “a court may not deny a motion to compel 
arbitration ‘unless it may be said with positive assurance that the . . . arbitration clause is 
not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the dispute.’”  Cup v. Ampco Pittsburgh 
Corp., 903 F.3d 58, 64–65 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting AT & T Techs., Inc., 475 U.S. at 650).  
In relevant part, the contract here reads: 
Except for actions for specific performance or injunctive relief, if a dispute 
or claim should arise that does not get resolved through negotiation of the 
parties, the parties will attempt in good faith to resolve the dispute or claim 
by mediation administered by the American Arbitration Association (AAA) 
under its Employment Mediation Rules, before resorting to arbitration. 
J.A. at 4.  Dr. Monfared argues that this language is limited to disputes over the 
interpretation of the letter agreement itself, because an earlier sentence in the same 
section of the contract states that “[t]his letter agreement shall be deemed to have been 
made and shall be construed and interpreted in accordance with the laws of the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.”  She notes that, unlike many arbitration agreements, 
hers does not include language referring to “any claim arising from” her employment, or 
the like.   
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We do not agree.  It does not appear that any federal court has addressed an 
arbitration agreement with language similar to this one.  But in light of the presumption 
in favor of arbitrability, we think the phrase “if a dispute or claim should arise” is best 
understood as functionally equivalent to more standard language that would expressly 
sweep in any claim relating to Dr. Monfared’s employment.  The only textual exclusion 
applies only to actions for specific performance or injunctive relief.  And it does not 
make sense to view the entire section at issue as limited to the interpretation of the 
contract itself.  The section includes effectively three provisions: a choice-of-law 
provision stating that Pennsylvania law shall apply to the construction of the contract; a 
forum selection clause providing for jurisdiction in the Lehigh County court; and the 
arbitration provision.  The choice-of-law provision is naturally limited to interpretation of 
the contract, and this does not reflect on the neighboring provisions, which address 
separate concerns. 
Thus we affirm. 
_______________________________ 
